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II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.  Nature of the Case
Two Jinn, Inc., which does business in Idaho as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail
Bonds (hereinafter “Two Jinn” or “Aladdin”), appeals from the district court’s memorandum
opinion and order (“District Court Order”) denying Two Jinn’s Motion to Exonerate Bond.  This
Court should reverse the District Court Order because the district court abused its discretion by
not considering Two Jinn’s efforts to recover the defendant pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
(“I.C.R.”) 46(h)(1) and 46(h)(1)(B).   
B.  Procedural History and Statement of Facts
On November 28, 2014, Defendant Travis Wharton was arrested and charged with drug
trafficking, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1)(C), and resisting or obstructing officers, in
violation of I.C. § 18-705.  Record (“R.”) 12.  Defendant Wharton made an initial appearance on
December 1, 2014 and the magistrate judge set bond at $100,000.  R. 12.  On March 27, 2015,
Two Jinn posted a $100,000 bond for Defendant Wharton as the authorized agent for American
Contractors Indemnity Company (“American Contractors”).  R. 175.  On September 28, 2015,
Wharton failed to appear for a suppression hearing. R. 176.   The district court subsequently
forfeited the bond. Id.     
When Two Jinn discovered that Wharton had failed to appear, it immediately hired
Northwest Surety Investigations (“NSI”) to initiate a nationwide search for Wharton.  R. 105. 
NSI investigators, including NSI Investigator Shaun Skogrand (“Skogrand”), diligently sought
Wharton and began a nationwide search for his whereabouts.
In December 2015, Skogrand and others traveled to Iowa to seek Wharton.  R. 106.  Upon
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learning that Wharton might be in California, Skogrand assigned California-based investigators
to seek Wharton.  Investigator Skogrand continued to seek Wharton and returned to Iowa in
February 2016.  R. 107.  
On March 15, 2016, Investigator Skogrand and others traveled to Denver, Colorado and
located Wharton’s residence.  R. 108.  On March 16, 2016, Skogrand learned that Wharton had
been arrested and was in the custody of the Jefferson County Sheriff in Golden, Colorado.  Id. 
Skogrand contacted the Elmore County Sheriff’s Office and helped ensure that the warrant was
served on Defendant Wharton while in custody in Jefferson County.  Id.
On March 24, 2016, Two Jinn filed a Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond
and Conditional Request for Hearing and accompanying memorandum.  On April 1, 2016, Two
Jinn filed an amended Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture with accompanying affidavits.  
On April 29, 2016, the Elmore County Prosecutor’s Office filed an Objection to Aladdin
and American Contractors’ Motion to Exonerate.  Later that day, Aladdin filed a Response to
State’s Objection to Aladdin and American Contractors’ Motion to Exonerate.  On May 2, 2016,
the district court held an evidentiary hearing at which Investigator Skogrand testified to the
significant efforts made by Two Jinn and its agents in seeking the return of Defendant Wharton.
R. 131.
On May 26, 2016, the district court entered its Order Regarding Motion to Exonerate
Bond, which denied in full Two Jinn’s Motion to Exonerate Bond.  R. 133-158.  Two Jinn filed a
timely notice of appeal and filed a Motion for Stay of Order Regarding Motion to Exonerate
Bond.  R. 159-161. On July 26, 2016, the district court entered an Order for a Stay of the
Remittance of the Forfeiture.  R. 204-05.
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 This appeal timely follows. 
III.  ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the district court err by abusing its discretion in denying Appellant's Motion to Set
Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond?
IV.  ARGUMENT
A.  The district court abused its discretion in denying Two Jinn’s Motion to Set Aside
Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond by refusing to consider Two Jinn’s efforts to locate
and apprehend the defendant.
1.  Standard of Review
“Whether to set aside the forfeiture of a bail bond under I.C.R. 46 is committed to the
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent a finding that the trial court abused
its discretion.”  State v. Big Dawg Bail Bonds, 157 Idaho 373, 376, 336 P.3d 306, 309 (Ct. App.
2014).  “In determining whether a court has abused its discretion, this Court considers: (1)
whether the court correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.”  Id., quoting State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 151 Idaho 725, 728, 264 P.3d 66, 69
(2011).  However, this Court also “exercises free review over interpretation of statutes and the
Idaho Criminal Rules.”  State v. Hillbroom, 158 Idaho 789, 791, 352 P.3d 999, 1001 (2015),
citing Hausladen v. Knoche, 149 Idaho 449, 452, 235 P.3d 399, 402 (2010).  
2.  Argument
Idaho Code § 19-2917 provides that a district court may “direct that the order of forfeiture
be set aside, in whole or in part, as provided by rules adopted by the Supreme Court, if it appears
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justice so requires.”  In turn, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted I.C.R. 46(h), which states that
the district court “may direct that the forfeiture be set aside, in whole or in part, upon such
conditions as the court may impose, if it appears that justice does not require the enforcement of
the forfeiture.”  I.C.R. 46(h)(1).  Further, I.C.R. 46(h)(1) states:
[T]he court shall consider all relevant factors, which may include but not be limited to the
following:
(A) the willfulness of the defendant’s violation of the obligation to appear;
(B) the participation of the person posting bail in locating and apprehending the
defendant;
(C) the costs, inconvenience, and prejudice suffered by the state as a result of the
defendant’s violation of the obligation to appear; 
(D) any intangible costs;
(E) the public’s interest in insuring a defendant’s appearance; 
(F) any mitigating factors;
(G) whether the state exhibited any actual interest in regaining custody of the defendant
through prompt efforts to extradite him;
(H) whether the bonding company has attempted to assist or persuade the defendant to
expedite his return to Idaho by exercising his rights under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers, Idaho Code § 19-5001 et seq.; and 
(I) the need to deter the defendant and others from future violations.   
In analyzing Two Jinn’s Motion to Exonerate Bond, the district court correctly noted that
the “decision whether or not to set aside the forfeiture is one left to the discretion of this Court.” 
R. 138.  The district court also recognized that it was required under I.C.R. 46(h) to consider “all
relevant factors.”  Id.  The district court thus specifically indicated it would  “consider those
factors enumerated in Rule 46(h) and “then consider those factors, if any, not enumerated in the
rule that either party contends are relevant.”  R. 138.  
In the District Court Order, the district court properly weighed most factors enumerated
under Rule 46(h), including the willfulness of the defendant’s violation of the obligation to
appear, the costs and prejudice suffered by the state as a result of defendant’s failure to appear,
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the public’s interest in ensuring defendant’s presence, whether the bonding company had
attempted to expedite defendant’s return under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, and the
need to deter the defendant and others from future violations.  R. 138-156.
However, the district court acted outside the outer boundaries of its discretion and acted
inconsistently with applicable legal standards when it failed to consider Two Jinn’s efforts to
locate and apprehend Defendant Wharton under either I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B) or, in the alternative, as
an additional relevant factor under I.C.R. 46(h)(1).  As noted by the district court, Two Jinn
adduced substantial evidence documenting its significant efforts to locate and apprehend
Defendant Wharton after he failed to appear for a suppression hearing. R. 140-41.  Two Jinn
provided an affidavit from NSI Investigator Shaun Skogrand and an affidavit from Two Jinn
employee Lynn Mirajkar detailing Two Jinn’s efforts in attempting to apprehend Wharton. 
Further, at the hearing set for Two Jinn’s motion, Two Jinn elicited testimony from Investigator
Skogrand detailing the efforts he had undertaken as an agent for Two Jinn.  R. 141.  
Although such testimony was relevant to the factor enumerated at I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B) and
should have been considered by the district court, the district court explicitly refused to consider
this evidence when balancing the factors enumerated by I.C.R. 46(h).  Instead, the district court
determined that while “Aladdin ha[d] presented evidence of actions taken by a private
investigation firm hired by Aladdin to locate the defendant after his failure to appear,” the district
court concluded that there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that Two Jinn was
“the person posting bail”–and that Two Jinn’s efforts at returning Wharton to custody should
therefore not be considered.  R. 140-41.   The district court stated in pertinent part:
In this case, the Court concludes American Contractors is the “person who posted bail”
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for purposes of this rule.  American Contractors executed the bond undertaking to
guarantee the defendant’s appearance.  It is against American Contractors that judgment
may enter if the forefeiture is not set aside and the bail is not paid.  From the caption of its
motion, Aladdin appears to be asserting that it is “an agent” of American Contractors. 
While it fails to specifically articulate this argument, the Court presumes Aladdin intends
that its actions to locate and apprehend the defendant be attributed to the surety for this
motion because Aladdin and the surety have some agency relationship.  The problem, of
course, is that Aladdin has presented no evidence to show that an agency relationship
exists between it and American Contractors and if one does what the nature and scope of
the relationship might be.  In its memorandum in support of its motion, Aladdin asserts
that “Aladdin posted a $100,000 bond for Defendant Travis Wharton as the authorized
agent for American Contractors Indemnity Company.”  (Mem. in Supp. Mtn. p. 1).  As
proof of this proposition, Aladdin cites to the “court file.”  Id.  The only place Aladdin’s
name appears in the Court file is at the top of the bond itself.  Aladdin is listed as the
agent designated by American Contractors to receive notice pursuant to I.C. § 19-2915(3). 
The Court has no evidence showing that Aladdin was also listed in the records of the
Idaho Department of Insurance to receive notices on American Contractors [sic] behalf
pursuant to I.C.R. 46(h)(3). 
R. 144-45.  
Thus, the district court concluded it could not identify the nature of the relationship
between Two Jinn and American Contractors.  R. 146.  Because “[t]here [was] no evidence
American Contractors took any actions to locate and apprehend the defendant after his failure to
appear,” the Court found that no evidence in favor of the factor enumerated in I.C.R.
46(h)(1)(B)–“the participation of the person posting bail in locating and apprehending the
defendant”–had been presented to the court.  As such, the district court found that the factor
enumerated in I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B) weighed against setting aside the forfeiture of bail.  Id.  The
district court’s factual determination and its subsequent failure to consider Two Jinn’s efforts
was an abuse of discretion. 
a.  Two Jinn Acted as an Agent of Indemnity American Contractors.
A bail bond, as set forth by Idaho Code §§ 19-2905(3) and 19-2907, is a financial
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guarantee filed with a court to ensure that a defendant will appear as required.  A bail bond
agreement is a suretyship contract between 1) the State and 2) a criminal defendant and his or her
surety, whereby the surety guarantees the defendant’s appearance.  State v. Abracadabra Bail
Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 116, 952 P.3d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 1998).  Here, “American Contractors
agreed to guarantee Mr. Wharton’s appearance in court and, upon his failure to appear, to be
liable to the State of Idaho for payment of the sum Mr. Wharton was required to post with the
clerk to secure his release from custody.”  R. 177.  
While the district court asserted there was no evidence indicating that Two Jinn was “the
party posting bond,” this factual determination is simply wrong.  As noted in the District Court
Order, a power of attorney form attached to the bond in question issued by American Contractors
“[gave] Aladdin the power to act as the attorney-in-fact for American Contractors in ‘executing  
. . . a bail bond.’  The form also authorize[d] Aladdin as attorney-in-fact to insert in the power of
attorney form the name of the person on whose behalf the bond is being given.”  R. 184. 
Sufficient evidence thus exists to demonstrate Two Jinn acted on behalf and as an agent of
American Contractors.   
 In addition, the Idaho Bail Act (Idaho Code § 19-2901 et seq.) indicates that in the event
a defendant fails to appear and the court orders forfeiture of bail, “[t]he clerk shall provide the
person posting bail written notice of the order of forfeiture by mailing notice within five (5)
business days of the order of forfeiture to the last known address of the person posting bail or
that person’s designated agent.”  Idaho Code § 19-2915(3).  In this matter, the district court noted
that the bond issued in this matter confirmed that “Aladdin [was] listed as the agent designated
by American Contractors to receive notices pursuant to I.C. § 19-2915(3).”  R. 187.  In fact, the
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district court also noted that “the clerk of the court sent notice pursuant to I.C. § 19-2915 to
American Contractors and its agent authorized to receive such notices, Aladdin Bail Bonds
(Aladdin), of the court’s intention to discharge the order of forfeiture if Mr. Wharton was not
brought before the Court within 180 days of forfeiture.”  R. 176.    
Based upon the facts before the district court, it is plainly evident that Two Jinn was
engaged as an agent of American Contractors regarding this bond.  The court clerk itself
recognized Two Jinn’s agency relationship with American Contractors when it provided notice to
Two Jinn of the order of forfeiture pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2915(3).  The district court’s
factual determination that there was no relationship between Two Jinn and American Contractors
is refuted by the evidence in the record.  For that reason, this Court should find that the district
court’s factual determination that there was no evidence of American Contractors’ attempts to
locate and apprehend Wharton was plainly wrong; based upon this plain factual error, the district
court abused its discretion by failing to appropriately weigh the enumerated factor set forth by
I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B) in determining if the bond should be exonerated pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-
2917 and I.C.R. 46(h).       
b.  The district court abused its discretion by failing to consider Two Jinn’s attempts to
apprehend the defendant as an unenumerated relevant factor pursuant to I.C.R. 46(h)(1).
As the district court itself noted, “in deciding how to to exercise [its] discretion, [the
district court] is required under Rule 46(h) to consider a number of factors.  Indeed, the rule
requires the [district court] to consider ‘all relevant factors.’” R. 180.  The district court further
noted that “[t]he rule does not define relevant in this context” and concluded that a “relevant
factor” under I.C.R. 46(h) was “any factor that may make the Court more or less likely to set
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aside the forfeiture.”  Id.  While I.C.R. 46(h) lists eight categories that the district court must
consider, such rule also indicates that relevant factors requiring the court’s consideration are not
limited to the enumerated subcategories.  (“ . . . In ruling upon such a motion, the court shall
consider all relevant factors, which may include but not be limited to the following . . . ”) I.C.R.
46(h)(1).   
Thus, even if the district court correctly determined that Two Jinn’s efforts at locating and
apprehending Wharton should not be considered pursuant to the enumerated factor set forth at
I.C.R. 46(h)(1)(B), the district court should have next examined if Two Jinn’s efforts at locating
and apprehending Mr. Wharton were a relevant factor that might make the district court more or
less likely to set aside the forfeiture under I.C.R. 46(h)(1).
The district court recognized that Two Jinn had a significant interest in returning Mr.
Wharton to custody after he had failed to appear and had engaged in substantial efforts to secure
his return to custody.  The district court noted that it was “not completely ignorant of the way the
bail bond industry works.  Certainly Aladdin [was] not expending the resources to hire a private
investigator to fly around the country in an attempt to track Mr. Wharton down unless Aladdin
[had] some exposure for the bail liability or someone is compensating it for those services.”  R.
187.  Nonetheless, the district court refused to consider such actions as a relevant factor under
I.C.R. 46(h)(1).    
Two Jinn’s repeated efforts to locate Wharton and its participation in actually locating
Wharton and aiding in serving the Elmore County warrant upon Wharton are axiomatic examples
of actions relevant to a court’s determination of whether justice requires the exoneration of part
or all of a bond.  After all, the primary purpose of bail is to ensure the presence of the accused. 
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State v. Quick Release Bonds, 144 Idaho 651, 655, 167 P.3d 788, 792 (Ct. App. 2007).  Bail
agents have the authority, and in fact are encouraged, to arrest a defendant who has missed a
court appearance and return him to court.  See Idaho Code § 19-2914 (“at any time before the
exoneration of bail, the surety insurance company or its bail agent . . . may empower any person
of suitable age and discretion to arrest the defendant at any place within the state”); Idaho Code §
19-2922 (“court shall order the bail exonerated” if the “defendant has appeared before the court
within one hundred eighty (180) days of the court’s order of forfeiture”).
The purpose of bail is served by providing the surety a financial incentive to locate
absconders and return them to court.  See County Bonding Agency v. State, 724 So.2d 131, 133
(Fla. App. 1998) (“The purpose of [a Florida statute permitting exoneration when the surety has
substantially attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or surrender of the defendant] is to
create a financial incentive for sureties to locate and apprehend fugitives”]; Board of Com’rs of
Brevard v. Barber Bonding Agency, 860 So.2d 10, 12 (Fla. App. 2003) (Liberal interpretation of
forfeiture statutes in favor of sureties provides incentives to sureties “to pursue those who flee
the jurisdiction”).  Surety companies throughout Idaho and the country rely upon agent
companies to supervise defendants and to locate and apprehend absconders.  For these reasons,
Two Jinn’s attempts to locate and apprehend Wharton were relevant to the district court’s inquiry
pursuant to I.C.R. 46(h)(1) and Idaho Code § 19-2917 as to whether justice required the
exoneration of part or all of the bond. 
Because the Court failed to further consider Two Jinn’s actions as a relevant but
unenumerated factor pursuant to I.C.R. 46(h)(1), the district court abused its discretion and
wrongly weighed the relevant factors for exoneration of the bond pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-
11
2917.  Two Jinn asks this Court to find that the district court abused its discretion in holding
otherwise.       
V.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Two Jinn asks that this Court reverse the denial of its
Motion to Exonerate Bond and remand for the district court to properly consider the factors
enumerated in I.C.R. 46(h). 
Respectfully submitted this 2  day of November, 2016.nd
/s/Christopher Sherman                               
Christopher D. Sherman
Attorney for Aladdin/Two Jinn, Inc.
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